THE ENERGY INDUSTRY TIMES - FEBRUARY 2019
13
Industry Perspective
B
rexit – and all the ongoing
parliamentary wrangling – is
seldom out of the headlines.
But amidst all the speculation that
businesses may be: considering relo-
cating to the mainland; the UK may
soon be able to strike new trade
deals with the growth economies;
and potential agreements on regula-
tory standards, the potential impact
of the UK’s withdrawal from the Eu-
ropean Atomic Energy Community,
commonly known as ‘Euratom’, is
often overlooked.
However, this is a dangerous lapse
to ignore. It is, quite literally, a nu-
clear issue, with an effect likely to be
far reaching and profound.
After all, the UK’s membership in
Euratom provides the framework for
bilateral cooperation in nuclear trade
between and among the United
Kingdom and the other 27 EU states
that are party to the treaty, including
major equipment and material sup-
pliers such as France, for example.
Additionally, through bilateral nu-
clear cooperation agreements be-
tween the European Atomic Energy
Community and other states, the
UK’s participation in the Communi-
ty provides the basis for nuclear
power cooperation with Australia,
Argentina, Canada, Japan, Kazakh-
stan, South Africa, Ukraine, the
United States, and Uzbekistan. Once
the UK exits Euratom on March 29,
2019, the nuclear cooperation agree-
ments that the UK has through Eura-
tom shall no longer be in effect and
shall cease to function.
The UK’s post-Brexit nuclear
strategy has been to put in place by
the end of March 2019 all the inter-
national agreements it requires to
ensure uninterrupted cooperation
and trade in the civil nuclear sector,
and to negotiate an orderly with-
drawal from Euratom. This entails
negotiating a new nuclear coopera-
tion agreement with Euratom, as
well as simultaneously negotiating
individual agreements with the
UK’s major nuclear trade partners.
Exit from Euratom also requires
setting up a domestic nuclear safe-
guards programme to take over
once the Euratom safeguards ar-
rangements are no longer in effect.
Once the UK leaves Euratom, the
UK will have the responsibility of
ensuring that all ores, source materi-
als and special ssile materials cov-
ered by the Euratom Treaty and pres-
ent in the UK post-Brexit are
handled in accordance with applica-
ble international treaties and conven-
tions on nuclear safety, safeguards,
non-proliferation and physical pro-
tection of nuclear materials, and in-
ternational treaties and conventions
on the safety of spent fuel manage-
ment and the safety of radioactive
waste management.
The good news is that the UK gov-
ernment has reported remarkable
progress in setting up a domestic
safeguards regime to replace the
Euratom safeguards regime and has
also made remarkable progress in
putting new nuclear trade agree-
ments in place.
The UK is well along the way to-
wards implementing a domestic
safeguards system with the equiva-
lent effectiveness and coverage as
that previously provided under
Euratom.
The new State System of Account-
ing for and Control of Nuclear Mate-
rial (SSAC) will be administered by
the Ofce of Nuclear Regulation
(ONR) and will ensure that the UK
continues to meet its international
non-proliferation commitments in
the post-Brexit world. The ONR is
developing a regulatory framework
to implement the SSAC, including a
new information system capable of
processing nuclear material accoun-
tancy reports. The ONR will also
need to hire and train safeguards in-
spectors, nuclear material accoun-
tants, and safeguards ofcers to ad-
minister these new systems and to
ensure compliance with the SSAC.
In addition to developing the new
domestic safeguards regime, the UK
has also made astounding progress
in putting new nuclear cooperation
agreements in place with major sup-
plier countries.
In hindsight, there was little to be
optimistic about regarding a “soft
landing” for the UK nuclear industry
after Brexit. Getting all the neces-
sary third-party cooperation agree-
ments in place, especially consider-
ing the resources necessary to
negotiate the terms and conditions of
the larger Brexit from the European
Union, was an extraordinarily ambi-
tious undertaking, and one that was
received with a dose of healthy scep-
ticism from many observers.
Past implementation of treaties
with Euratom and third parties have
proceeded at a glacial pace and, giv-
en the hostility that the EU has
shown to the UK at times during the
Brexit process, there were few signs
of hope. Not helping matters, Barack
Obama, the former President of the
United States, starkly warned that
the UK would be at the “back of the
queue” in any trade deal with the
United States if the country chose to
leave the EU.
Despite generally low expecta-
tions for success, the UK govern-
ment has made good progress on
reaching new nuclear cooperation
agreements with many of its non-
EU trading partners. A new agree-
ment between the UK and the Unit-
ed States was signed on May 4,
2018, and received US Congressio-
nal approval in August 2018, and
that agreement is now before Parlia-
ment for nal approval.
Likewise, new nuclear cooperation
agreements have been agreed with
Australia and Canada, which are
both major suppliers of nuclear ma-
terials to the UK. Negotiations to up-
date the existing nuclear cooperation
agreement with Japan also appear to
be on-track. Meanwhile, nuclear co-
operation agreements with China
and Russia continue to remain in ef-
fect, and the UK continues to discuss
arrangements for ongoing coopera-
tion with countries where nuclear
agreements are not a requirement but
are nonetheless currently in place
through Euratom, such as Kazakh-
stan and Uzbekistan, which are both
major global suppliers of uranium.
However, an orderly exit from Eur-
atom requires more than developing
a domestic nuclear safeguards re-
gime and putting a handful of nucle-
ar cooperation agreements in place,
as these don’t address the “unwind-
ing” of the UK from Euratom. Nor
do any of the nuclear cooperation
agreements that have been put in
place provide for nuclear trade be-
tween the UK and the EU. Nuclear
commerce with key European trad-
ing partners, France most notably,
will be interrupted unless and until a
new treaty between the UK and Eur-
atom is put in place. The UK negoti-
ated a comprehensive Agreement on
the withdrawal of the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland from the European Union
and the European Atomic Energy
Community (“Withdrawal Agree-
ment”), but that agreement was
soundly defeated by Parliament in
the 15 January 2019 “meaningful
vote” on Brexit.
While there are many criticisms to
be made of the Withdrawal Agree-
ment, one thing it did do very well
was orchestrate a deliberate and me-
thodical exit for the UK from Eura-
tom, while maintaining security and
safeguards standards at their current
levels. To be clear, both the EU and
the UK appear to agree on virtually
every aspect of the UK’s withdrawal
from Euratom, down to the last de-
tail. So, what is the problem?
Exasperatingly, even though the
details of an orderly exit from Eura-
tom have been worked out, the cur-
rent Euratom exit deal is being held
hostage to the overall Brexit “deal”.
Unfortunately, with each passing
day, hope of securing any kind of
deal – even a bad one – seems in-
creasingly unlikely.
With the Brexit deadline fast ap-
proaching, there appears to be only
one viable option to keep nuclear
commerce open with the EU: split
exit from Euratom from the larger
Brexit agenda. This would require
the UK to forgo its current “all or
nothing” approach and introduce
legislation to carve out the Euratom
deal for separate approval by Parlia-
ment. Separating exit from the Euro-
pean Union from exit from the Euro-
pean Atomic Energy Community
would ensure that the nation’s nucle-
ar commerce continues to operate
during an orderly transition from
Euratom, and while this may not be
a headline-grabbing title akin to the
Irish backstop or customs union, it
would allow a largely unseen, but vi-
tal, UK sector to continue functioning.
Ensuring a safe and orderly exit
from Euratom is necessary to protect
nuclear energy generation both in the
UK and EU, but nalising an agree-
ment has been overshadowed by the
larger Brexit debate. With agree-
ments in place, or largely negotiated,
with the almost all UK nuclear trad-
ing partners, the lack of a Euratom
agreement is notable. Solving this is-
sue would help prevent a costly di-
lemma in the long run but, perhaps
of more interest to the government, it
would also demonstrate that the gov-
ernment is capable of solving prob-
lems, even if just one at a time.
Vince Zabielski is a former nuclear
engineer and now partner at the
international law rm Pillsbury.
The potential impact of the UK’s withdrawal from the European Atomic Energy Community
could have massive impacts. But with the March 29th deadline for Brexit fast approaching,
there appears to be only one viable option to keep nuclear commerce open with the EU.
Vince Zabielski explains.
Euratom: now what?
Zabielski: the current Euratom
exit deal is being held hostage
to the overall Brexit “deal”